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 1 
1. In search of “Providence” 
 
        1.1. Road to exceptional rhetoric 
 
                     
                             “God has a special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States of America.”1 
 
           
No matter whether the origin of this quote can be traced back to the 19th century Prussian 
statesman Otto von Bismarck (as it allegedly is) or not, it definitely makes one reflect the 
current role of the United States of America2 in the world, and how it actually got its 
unprecedented and privileged status as a political, economic and military superpower. 
 
However, the aim of this study is not to trace the origin of the dominant role of the United 
States in the world politics, or for that matter even to trace the origin of the idea of 
“American exceptionalism”. Rather, I will try to find out how this vague idea of United 
States dominance or exceptionalism has framed the policies and the rhetoric of two United 
States presidents in the 1970s (Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter).  
 
My main focus will be on the rhetorical side, although the public papers and the speeches 
of the presidents also delineate policy goals of the presidents reasonably well. Rhetorical 
analysis makes this kind of constructivist approach possible since one cannot any more 
deem rhetoric as “merely rhetoric”. The aim of this approach is not that much to define 
how presidents Ford and Carter succeeded in fulfilling their policy formulations, but rather, 
to find out what these formulations were, and how they were linked to the notion of the 
United States being “exceptional”. 
 
1970s was a decade of high turbulence in American politics. The United States was trapped 
in the Vietnam War debacle well to the beginning of the decade, with finally helicopters 
evacuating the United States embassy personnel amidst the fall of Saigon. After the 
                                                
1 Quoted in Mead, Walter Russell (2002): Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed 
the World. Taylor & Francis Group, New York. 
2 The United States of America is referred to in this study by “The United States” and “America”. 
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Watergate scandal, which forced Richard Nixon to resign from the presidency, Gerald 
Ford's administration inherited huge economic challenges relating to the rampant inflation 
and the oil price increases of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). The potential dividing force of the civil rights movement was not that far from the 
historical memory either. After Watergate, the trust in governing officials was also low. 
 
Obviously, 1970s was a time of breakthrough in the development of the most powerful 
nation in the world at the time, the United States. And obviously, these kind of 
breakthroughs also make for good topics for academic research. Obviously, the Vietnam 
fiasco and the dependence on foreign oil were also a serious blow to the dominant 
superpower. So, how did presidents Ford and Carter manage to hold up the notion of 
American credibility and all-pervasiveness in world politics in their rhetoric after the 
quagmire in Vietnam?  
 
The fact that makes this breakthrough period even more interesting is the difference of 
party affiliations that the two presidents under study represented. How did the Republican 
Ford and the Democratic Carter express their views on American exceptionalism in their 
rhetoric if they did, and how did this manifest itself? The hypothesis of this study is that 
the rhetoric of Ford and Carter may have differed from each other in their content, even 
radically, but nonetheless represented, by their “core”, the underlying tradition of American 
exceptionalism, and the notion that the United States was morally or spiritually a nation 
that other nations should have been modeled upon. 
                        
When it comes to the study of rhetoric, the Cold War atmosphere seems to be an ideal 
object of analysis since it is so full of semantics, symbols, metaphors and social 
constructions. Although “hot” warfare was at play as well, namely in covert operations or 
proxy wars between the two blocs, the Cold War era was, for the most part, a matter of 
symbolic action. The weapons of war were not that much guns, bombs, missiles, and the 
like, but words and images.3 
                                                
3 Medhurst, Martin J. (1997): Rhetoric and Cold War: Strategic Approach. In Medhurst, Martin J. – Ivie, 
Robert L. – Wander, Philip – Scott, Robert L. (ed.): Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology. 
Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, Michigan, 19.  
 3 
 
Promoting the idea of American exceptionalism seems to be a legitimate way for presidents 
in trying to unite their nation in a time of turmoil. The basis for a strong national unity can 
be traced from the history. The signs of presidents' “exceptionalist” thinking can be 
delineated from their use of singular words or concepts, i.e. references to the 17th century 
Puritan settlers of America, or to the at the time 200 years old United States constitution. 
However, this study is not based on a quantitative content analysis of the presidents' 
rhetoric. The goal is not to count the words of the presidents and make oversimplified 
conclusions based on that. The aim of this study is to set the presidents' rhetoric in its 
historical context and to plunge beyond the rhetoric into the world of larger, more 
symbolic, and more socially constructed meanings. 
 
The data of this study are the public papers of the presidents, namely the Inauguration 
Addresses and the annual State of the Union Addresses, but also, for example, the more 
selective addresses of the presidents on some specific topics in a time of crisis or other 
preoccupations, which in Ford's time included for example addresses on inflation and 
national energy policy, and in Carter's time the American embassy workers held hostage in 
Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The focus while analyzing the data is on the 
“big picture” provided by the State of the Union addresses, although the aim is also to take 
account of all the public papers where the elements of public speaking and rhetorical 
devices are present. 
 
       1.2. Previous research 
 
There seems to be a reasonably small amount of research focusing on Gerald Ford's 
rhetoric from the time he was president, whereas much more has been written about Jimmy 
Carter's time in office, some studies even analyzing his rhetoric in the context of American 
values or the mythical American Dream.4  
                                                
4 See e.g. Kane, John (2003): American Values or Human Rights? U.S. Foreign Policy and the Fractured 
Myth of Virtuous Power. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 33, 4; Young, Marilyn J. (2008): Of Allies and 
Enemies: Old Wine in New Bottles or New Wine in an Old Jug? In Aune, James Arnt – Medhurst, Martin J. 
(ed.): Presidential Rhetoric: Prospect of Presidential Rhetoric. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 
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Ford was never elected to the highest office, but as a vice-president, inherited the 
presidency after the resignation of his predecessor, Richard Nixon. It is possible that Ford's 
interim presidency has made some scholars to treat his two-and-a-half-year presidency as 
some sort of a caretaker government, especially when it comes to rhetoric. Some textbooks 
covering United States foreign policy do not even grant Ford an own chapter, and instead 
put him under the chapter of Nixon's term in office.5 
 
There have been, however, some takes on Ford's oratorical endeavors as well, although 
they are not specific studies on Ford or his rhetoric, but some all-encompassing textbooks 
on the United States presidents as orators. Craig Allen Smith maintains the view that Ford's 
focus on economic matters in the aftermath of the Vietnam nightmare was a way of 
increasing national unity by redirecting the American people's focus on non-Vietnam-
related issues. According to Smith, Ford's early pardon of Nixon also supports this view. 
By setting the record straight early on case Nixon, so that the country avoided highly 
publicized and humiliating trial procedures, Ford was able to stop the wounds of Vietnam 
from dividing the country even more. Smith also states that since Ford's nearly entire staff 
familiar with the policy apparatus were made up of Nixon holdovers, the pardon decision 
was politically necessary for Ford as well.6  
 
Bernard L. Brock has analyzed Ford's inaugural address in 1974 and agrees with the view 
that Ford affirmed a united nation and, for that matter, peace. Brock does not, however, 
specifically note any traces of American exceptionalism in Ford's speech. He focuses in his 
article more on Ford's political standing after pardoning Nixon. Brock states that Ford had 
troubles separating himself at least rhetorically from Nixon after the pardon.7 
                                                
Texas. 
5 Melanson, Richard A. (1996): American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus 
from Nixon to Clinton. 2nd edition, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York.  
6 Smith, Craig Allen (1995): Gerald R. Ford. In Ryan, Halford (ed.): U.S. Presidents as Orators. Greenwood 
Press, Westport, Connecticut, 285–296 . 
7 Brock, Bernard L. (1993): President Gerald R. Ford's Inaugural Address, 1974. In Ryan, Halford (ed.): The 
Inaugural Addresses of Twentieth-Century American Presidents, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 235. 
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Trevor McCrisken states that Ford's time as president was “a time for healing”. This 
healing included restoring the faith of the American people in the moral legitimacy of its 
leadership. According to McCrisken, Ford was relatively successful in this task. As an 
example, McCrisken uses Ford's “exceptionalist” rhetoric when it came to the South 
Vietnamese refugees seeking asylum from the United States.8 
 
There seems to be more studies on Jimmy Carter. After all, he was an elected president 
who served a full term. He was also the first Democrat in the White House in eight years 
after Republicans had controlled the presidency since 1969. Carter also had a new vision of 
America's role in world affairs, and that was promoting human rights globally. 
 
According to Richard Melanson, “the fundamental task for his (Carter's) administration 
was the restoration of the faith of the American people in themselves, their government, 
and their foreign activities.”9 The aim of restoring this faith was to achieve national unity 
once again, and this was to be achieved by Carter's vision of human rights. In Melanson's 
words: “Carter saw foreign policy largely as the external manifestation of American life.”10 
Melanson states that overall however, Carter's rhetoric on foreign policy was sloppy. At 
least during the first two years it exuded optimism about the future, but by 1980, after the 
Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it had turned negative.11  
 
Mary E. Stuckey agrees with the view that the purpose of Carter was to unify the nation. 
Human rights was the natural extension of history, ideology and political practice that 
unified Americans. The renaissance promised by human rights had to begin at home.12  
 
                                                
8 McCrisken, Trevor (2004): American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam: U.S. Foreign Policy since 
1974. Palgrave Macmillan, Gordonsville, Virginia, 46, 54. 
9 Melanson, 90. 
10 Ibid, 90-94, 107. 
11 Ibid, 104, 116. 
12 Stuckey, Mary E. (2008): Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and the National Agenda. Texas A&M University 
Press, 42–43. 
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Betty Glad has, for her part, traced some exceptionalism in Carter's foreign policy. She 
states that Carter “pursued a foreign policy that was in the old “city on the hill”13 tradition, 
sharing some of its virtues as well as flaws.”14 According to Glad, there can be detected 
exceptionalism in Carter's rhetoric, in the vein of Woodrow Wilson.15  
 
Also Davis and Lynn-Jones maintain the view that Carter's rhetoric invoked American 
exceptionalism, especially in his Inaugural Address, but in the summer of 1979, when the 
Iranian revolution had contributed to an impression of failure for Carter's vision of the 
United States-led moralistic world order, he undermined his faith in the American people 
by speaking of a deep malaise among them.16 However, according to McCrisken, Carter’s 
rhetoric stayed “exceptional” since that seemed to be the only way to revive the American 
belief in exceptionalism.17 
 
In a similar fashion, John Kane has argued that Carter did not reject the exceptionalist 
tradition, but intended rather to save it by his own means. Carter's human rights initiative 
was a direct response to the crisis of American values after the Vietnam war, Watergate and 
the revelations concerning the dubious activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
The attraction of human rights was that they were not precisely American, but could be 
turned into universal values, despite having much in common with traditional American 
values of freedom and liberty. Kane states that Carter's resort to human rights, which bore 
international currency, was a way of avoiding imperialistic connotations.18 
 
In the vein of Kane, Marilyn J. Young is of the view that Carter tried to steer away from the 
                                                
13 “City upon a Hill” was the phrase by which an early Puritan settler John Winthrop described the role of the 
new colony in the world in his sermon on the Arbella ship in 1630. Winthrop, John (1630): A Model of 
Christian Charity, edited as a web document by The Winthrop Society. 
http://winthropsociety.com/doc_charity.php (accessed 17.4.2016). 
14 Glad, Betty (2009): An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of 
American Foreign Policy. Cornell University Press, New York, 280–286. 
15 Ibid, 280. 
16 Davis, Tami R. – Lynn-Jones, Sean M. (1987): Citty upon a Hill. Foreign Policy, no. 66, 27–28. 
17 McCrisken, 75. 
18 Kane, 775–777. 
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traditional notions of American exceptionalism by emphasizing human rights in his 
rhetoric. Young in a way puts Carter's foreign policy rhetoric in a Cold War continuum by 
stating that Carter was trying to disassociate himself from the rhetorical burdens of the 
Cold War, and so attempted to leverage détente.19 
 
There are also some quantitative, computer-based content analyses on presidential rhetoric, 
although they will probably not be of any significant use to my study. Elvin Lim, while not 
strictly specifying on Ford's or Carter's rhetoric, has come to the conclusion that 
“presidential rhetoric has become more anti-intellectual, more abstract, more assertive, 
more democratic, and more conversational.”20  
 
In a similar study, by focusing on certain keywords in presidential speeches and then 
analyzing them quantitatively, Rico Neumann and Kevin Coe have concluded that Jimmy 
Carter did not use the word “America” that often as his predecessors or successors. This 
does not imply, however, that Carter's rhetoric was not exceptional. As Neumann and Coe 
themselves make clear, their quantitative approach is certainly limited in captivating 
rhetorical nuances needed to construct presidential rhetoric in historical context.21 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
       2.1. Social constructivism 
 
Rhetorical analysis is based on the idea that social reality is constructed linguistically.22 As 
highlighted by Nicholas Onuf, human beings make the world as it is by talking, since they 
                                                
19 Young, 170. 
20 Lim, Elvin T. (2002): Five Trends in Presidential Rhetoric. An Analysis of Rhetoric from George 
Washington to Bill Clinton. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 32, 2, 346. 
21 Neumann, Rico – Coe, Kevin (2011): The Rhetoric in the Modern Presidency: A Quantitative Assessment. 
In Edwards, Jason A. – Weiss, David (ed.): The Rhetoric of American Exceptionalism: Critical Essays. 
McFarland & Company, Inc, Jefferson, North Carolina, 11–31. 
22 E.g. Kratochwil, Friedrich (2000): Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's 'Social Theory of International 
Politics' and the Constructivist Challenge. Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 29, 1, 73‒101. 
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are “social beings”. Saying is doing.23 This naturally links the words of the presidents to 
what they have done. 
 
Social constructivism could be of methodological use in international relations because of 
the different concepts it provides. What these concepts have in common is that they stress 
the supervenience of culture over nature in the age-old philosophical dichotomy between 
idealism and materialism.24  
 
From these concepts in the international relations environment one can discern “norms” 
which are, according to Jepperson et al., collective expectations about the behavior of 
particular actors in a particular environment. These norms function in the environment of 
“identities”, which refer to the images of individuality and distinctiveness projected by an 
actor and formed over time through relations with significant “others”. Thus the concept of 
“identity”, by convention, references mutually constructed and modifying images of self 
and other.25  
 
The ontology of social constructivism is best conceived as a triangle encompassing three 
concepts: intersubjectivity, context, and power. At the heart of the concept of 
intersubjectivity is the idea of a relation between individual or group agency, and the 
surrounding structure. Individuals and groups are not only shaped by the surrounding 
world, but can also change it through their agency. The constructivist view does not, 
however, grant ontological priority to either agency or structure, but rather view both as 
“mutually constituted”.26 
                                                
23 Onuf, Nicholas (1998): Constructivism: A User's Manual. In Kubálková, Vendulka ‒ Onuf, Nicholas ‒ 
Kowert, Paul (ed.): International Relations in a Constructed World. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 59.  
24 Wendt, Alexander (1999): Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
The United Kingdom, 41.  
25 Jepperson, Ronald L. – Wendt, Alexander – Katzenstein Peter J. (1996): Norms, Identity and Culture in 
National Security. In Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.): The Culture of National Security. Columbia University Press, 
New York, 54‒59. 
26 Klotz, Audie ‒ Lynch, Cecelia (2007): Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations. 
M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 3, 66; Fierke, K.M. (2001): Critical Methodology and Constructivism. In 
Fierke, Karin M. ‒ Jørgensen, Knud Erik (ed.): Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation. 
M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 117.  
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As Fierke and Jørgensen note, identities and interests are contingent and changeable.27 
Thus they are dependent on the context as well. In studying remarks and addresses made 
by the presidents from the perspective of American exceptionalism, one has to treat the 
audience of the speeches, the foreign policy traditions and the situation in world politics as 
forming the context. From a constructivist perspective, it could be helpful to conceive the 
rhetorical presidents as the “agents”, and the audience and the policy environment as 
“structure”, although this is not necessary since, in a constructivist sense, every actor could 
be defined as part of the “structure”. 
 
The role of rhetoric in this all-approaching constructivist structure is the linguistic one, the 
one that guides the structure by molding different meanings, and thus directing the social 
order. Kratochwil writes about everyday language and “language games” as providing the 
basic and leading elements of the conceptual structure, and somewhere along these 
“language games” is also the presidential rhetoric situated.28 
 
Although the presidential rhetoric could be seen as having a guiding or dominant role in 
determining the conceptual structure, its success is definitely not an easy task to achieve. In 
a social structure of conflicting meanings, the presidents are trying to create and propagate 
their own meanings and agenda. In a sense, they are trying to reduce the existing conflicts 
between them and their audience to make their proposals for policies look more righteous. 
The purpose of rhetoric is to find common premises for the speaker and the audience alike. 
 
The idea of American exceptionalism is one of these premises that has the potential of 
bridging the possible conceptual gaps between the presidents and the audience. It appeals 
to the American audience since Americans know their national identity, even if they did not 
agree with the president or were not that aroused by nationalist rhetoric. The first step of 
convincing rhetoric is to find a common premise or a number of premises, so that the 
                                                
27 Fierke, K.M. ‒ Jørgensen, Knud Erik (2001): Introduction. In Fierke, Karin M. ‒ Jørgensen, Knud Erik 
(ed.): Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 8.  
28 Kratochwil, Friedrich (1984): The Force of Prescriptions. International Organization, 38, 4, 707‒708. 
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audience is aware of what is being talked about. 
 
Adler states that even the most enduring institutions in society are based on collective and 
socially constructed understandings. These understandings were at first conceived by 
human consciousness, then diffused and consolidated until they were taken for granted.29 
Collective understandings are thus something that presidents might wish and expect their 
speeches to achieve. 
 
Finally, along with intersubjectivity and context, there is the element of power in the 
constructivist structure. According to Wendt, power and interest have the effects they do in 
the constructivist environment because of the virtue of ideas that make them up.30 From a 
constructive perspective, power is thus first and foremost defining power. It is power to fill 
the constructivist structure with ideas and set the agenda. Naturally, the president of the 
United States has, and had in the 1970s, a fair amount of power in world politics, and was 
thus able to use his position to mold the constructivist structure to his liking.  
 
       2.2. American exceptionalism 
 
American exceptionalism is an idea or a concept that the United States is qualitatively 
different from other states.31 According to this concept, the country was envisaged by the 
Founding Fathers as a nation with a mission to propagate its special form of political 
morality. This morality included a set of propositions held to be “self-evident”, that is life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Humanity was visualized by these “American” rights 
of man. These “American values” were cast in universal language, which concerned the 
whole humanity, not just Americans.32 The concept of “American exceptionalism” has been 
                                                
29 Adler, Emanuel (1997): Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics. European Journal of 
International Relations 3, 322. 
30 Wendt, 135. 
31Lipset, Seymour Martin (1996): American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword. W.W. Norton & 
Company, New York, 18. 
32 Young, 165; Germino, Dante (1984): The Inaugural Addresses of American Presidents: The Public 
Philosophy and Rhetoric. University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 3.  
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sometimes divided into “exemplar” and “missionary” strands,33 but since the purpose of 
this study is to compare rhetoric, not political goals, the two strands are just treated as 
“American exceptionalism”. 
 
The idea of exceptionalism first sprang from the “foreign traveler” literature. These are 
accounts written by visitors dealing with the way in which the United States works as 
compared with their home country or area.34 Perhaps the best known of these, and still 
widely influential, is Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America.35 The French 
aristocrat traveled through the United States in the 1830s to find out why the efforts at 
establishing democracy in his native country after the French Revolution had failed, while 
the American Revolution had produced a stable democratic republic. Eventually, 
Tocqueville's comparison turned out to be broader, comparing the United States to the 
whole of Europe, and in the process he was the first to explicitly refer to America as 
“exceptional”.36 
 
The idea of American uniqueness and moral superiority had been, however, hatched long 
before de Tocqueville had materialized the “exceptionalism” into his writings. It is also 
referred to in the earliest writings of the Puritan colonists. The Great Migration of Puritans 
in 1630 consisted of pilgrims leaving the old continent with a positive mission, of being a 
chosen people blessed by God. Massachusetts Bay Colony Governor John Winthrop 
described the Puritan mission to be “a Citty upon a Hill”, a moral beacon for the world 
upon whom the eyes of all people were cast.37 The Puritan vision combined a sense of 
destiny with a sense of moral obligation to others.38 And even when the Puritan influence 
                                                
33 “Exemplar” exceptionalism provides a model path for other nations to follow, whereas “missionary” 
exceptionalism tries actively to convert other nations to follow the example of the “exceptional” nation. 
Restad, Hilde Eliassen (2015): American Exceptionalism: An Idea that Made a Nation and Remade the 
World. Routledge, New York, 35. 
34 Lipset, 17. 
35 de Tocqueville, Alexis (2004): Democracy in America. Library of America, New York. 
36 Lipset, 17–18; McEvoy-Levy, Siobhán (2001) American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy: Public 
Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War. Palgrave, New York, 24. 
37 McEvoy-Levy, 24. 
38 Merelman, Richard M. (1984): Making Something of Ourselves: On Culture and Politics in the United 
States. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 4. 
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on American culture had subsided in the 18th century, its legacy provided the United States 
a secular moral exemplar, a “civil religion”, which is at the root of American 
exceptionalism even today.39 
 
The Puritan idea of exceptionalism became more layered with the help of the 
Enlightenment ideas of the late 18th century. Previously the idea of exceptionalism was, in 
the vein of Winthrop, justified by God, but now, the Founding Fathers could veto on reason 
as well. The independent United States of America for which they fought for, was to be 
based on reason, freedom, virtue, and equality before the law, all things that they found 
lacking in the old Britain of aristocracy, feudalism and intolerance.40 In the heart of 
“Americanism”, was the idea that in the new continent, one could make one's self, instead 
of just continuing the past.41  
 
It is to be noted, however, that the sermon that Winthrop gave was more of an empowered 
cry for liberation for the persecuted people rather than an overture in establishing a nation 
state.42 The nationalist character of exceptionalism established itself in the 19th century in 
the form of Monroe Doctrine43 and “Manifest Destiny”44. According to McEvoy-Levy, the 
                                                
39 McEvoy-Levy, 24; Merelman, 7; Gebhardt, Jürgen (1993): Americanism: Revolutionary Order and 
Societal Self-interpretation in the American Republic. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana. 
40 McEvoy-Levy, 24–25. 
41Bell, Daniel (1975): The End of American Exceptionalism. National Affairs, 41, 206. 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080527_197504111theendofamericanexceptionalismdanielbell.pdf 
(accessed 18.4.2016). 
42 Söderlind, Sylvia (2011): Introduction: The Shining of America. In Söderlind, Sylvia Carson  – Taylor, 
James (ed.): American Exceptionalisms: From Winthrop to Winfrey. State University of New York Press, 
Albany, New York, 4.  
43 The Monroe Doctrine was a policy introduced by the fifth president of the United States, James Monroe, in 
1823. It stated that the Western hemisphere was closed to any further European colonization and that the 
United States would protect the American continent as a space destined for democracy. Over the next century, 
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Manifest Destiny. Greenwood, Westport, Connecticut, 120. 
 13 
perception of European “threat” at the time further spurred separation from Europe and 
legitimized expansion in the Far East. By this time, the idea of exceptionalism had fueled 
the United States participation in the imperial geopolitics of the late 19th century.45 The 
idea of “Manifest Destiny” echoes in the “frontier thesis” of an early 20th century historian 
Frederick Jackson Turner who argued that the settlement of the vast hinterlands of the 
American west formed a distinctive American character and democracy.46 
 
After the Second World War, the notion of iron curtain dividing the world into two 
ideological blocs fortified the growing sense of American exceptionalism.47 This notion 
was naturally heightened by the fact that the world was in ruins after the destructive war, 
except the United States of course, with its powerful economy and military.  
 
In a sense, the notion of American exceptionalism has formed a coherent narrative from 
Winthrop's time to the Pax Americana, or even to the 21st century and its war on 
terrorism.48 The notion of American exceptionalism permeats every period of the history of 
the United States, and seems to be a powerful, if even the most powerful, agent concerning 
the identity of the United States and its political and social culture.49  
 
An interesting point in the development of the notion of exceptionalism are the value 
judgments that the term has collected over the centuries. When he was writing about 
America in the early 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville simply seemed to understand the 
exceptionalism as denoting a difference, not that the United States were anyhow better or 
superior. It was only later that the ethos of exceptionalism provided justifications for the 
                                                
45 McEvoy-Levy, 24–25. 
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47 Young, 160–161. 
48 Söderlind, 4. 
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United States to differentiate from established norms, rules and laws.50 
 
Scholars have disagreed whether American exceptionalism amounts to an ideology as 
such.51 It does not have a coherence of an ideology in a traditional sense. It has neither 
been codified as a means towards some definable political end. But it is certainly 
“ideological” since it underwrites so much of the United States history and foreign policy. 
Since the idea of American exceptionalism is so pervasive, Siobhán McEvoy-Levy has 
described it as a “para-ideological umbrella” covering all the related concepts and phrases 
as “manifest destiny”, “city on a hill”, “American dream” and “new world order”.52  
 
Academic work has been devoted to the propagation of the idea of exceptionalism, even if 
it was not its direct purpose. These studies, known as the work of the “consensus 
historians”, are, for the most part, written during the 1950s, and they certainly echo the 
spirit of that great unipolar moment that the United Stated had right after the World War 
II.53 In the absence of a discernible ideology, the leading consensus historian Richard 
Hofstadter put it aptly: “it has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be 
one.”54 
 
Whether American exceptionalism is an ideology or not, it definitely is a useful tool for 
Americans to make sense of the complex world they live in. Individuals and societies need 
to reduce that world to finite terms, and in the process, a sense of identity and purpose is 
needed.55 Thus, the notion of American exceptionalism is heavily based on socialization 
and constructivism. The United States is, in the words of Benedict Anderson, an “imagined 
                                                
50 Söderlind, 3; Lipset, 18. 
51 McCrisken, 6. 
52 McEvoy-Levy, 23. 
53 Tyrrell, Ian (1991): American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History. The American Historical 
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American Politics. Chicago.  
54 Quoted in Lipset, 18. 
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of American Foreign Relations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 221.  
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community”, which has built the idea of a shared national community by invoking national 
symbols.56 These symbols have not always been around of course, and had to be 
“invented” in the centuries following the time of the Puritans.57 
 
Even if the notion of American exceptionalism explains the American history and foreign 
policy to a reasonable degree, there has been critics. Ian Tyrrell has emphasized the more 
favorable conditions for the idea of American liberty to prosper in the first place. 
According to this view, being “exceptional” was possible, or at least, much easier since the 
United States avoided the class conflicts, revolutionary upheaval, and authoritarian 
governments prevalent in Europe.58 There is also a more world history oriented school of 
thought on American exceptionalism which emphasizes European influences on American 
history and political philosophy, and America's own global entanglements during the last 
five centuries and the influences they bore upon.59 
 
Even if Americans have taken the notion of exceptionalism to extent in a certain sense, as 
Hodgson suggests, one cannot simply treat it as a nonexistent myth. The idea of 
exceptionalism has guided the actions of America's leaders for centuries, and is therefore 
an interesting and valid theme of study. Of course, as Hunt reminds us, ideology does not 
explain everything. Politics and history are also products of economic and social structures, 
always part of something larger than one particular nation's identity and ideology.60 In a 
global context and the world politics of human reasoning, even randomly occurring 
coincidences have their own place in the making of history. Perhaps this speaks for 
American exceptionalism being more of a construction from everything around it rather 
than an ideology per se.  
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After the Vietnam War and Watergate, American exceptionalism seemed to be in a crisis, 
and the belief in it severely shaken. The United States seemed to have become a nation like 
all other nations.61 According to a Vietnam War historian George C. Herring, one of the 
chief casualties of the war was that “pervasive optimism” that was part of the American 
character.62 Rhetorically, however, American exceptionalism was still a useful tool for the  
presidents Ford and Carter to pick up the pieces of the “American century”. 
 
3. Analysis of rhetoric  
 
       3.1. How to define “rhetoric”? 
 
Rhetoric has been a focus of study at least since the age of Plato and Aristotle. In this 
context, it was for the most part conceived as oratorical skills or eloquence, focus being 
more on persuasive logic rather than the interplay between the speaker and the crowd.63 
However, one can trace the starting point in the development of rhetoric to Cicero's 
writings. Cicero, the Roman politician of antiquity, was one of the first to realize rhetoric 
as a process of argument which did not cover just the act of oration. This process makes it 
possible to unravel viewpoints that seem by default natural and unremarkable, and is thus 
closer to the symbolic interplay by which rhetoric is today conceived.64 
 
However, in the 20th century, the evolution of rhetorical studies has led to the concept of 
“new rhetoric” in contrast to the “old” one conceived in classical sense. This new rhetoric 
is an interdisciplinary field of study, and heavily based on the works of Kenneth Burke (A 
Rhetoric of Motives, 1950) and Chaïm Perelman (Traité de l'argumentation – la nouvelle 
                                                
61 McCrisken, 2–3; Bell, 222; Kissinger, Henry (2001): Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Towards a 
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63 Gill, Ann M. – Whedbee, Karen (1997): Rhetoric. In van Dijk, Teun A. (ed.): Discourse as Structure and 
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rhétorique 1958)65 . However, the classical definition of rhetoric is still as valid, it has just 
been extended by the notion of more interplay, by studying words by which an actor tries 
to induce action in others or form opinions.66 The new rhetoric can be conceived even 
wider: as a type of instrumental discourse which responds to, reinforces, or alters the 
understandings of an audience or a social community.67 Even Aristotle had origins of “new 
rhetoric” in his thinking, although for him it was more of “dialectic”, a theory concerning 
the logic of argumentation.68  
 
According to Perelman, “new rhetoric” is somewhat a combination of Aristotle's rhetoric 
and dialectic: it is concerned with discourse addressed to any sort of audience, even 
examining arguments addressed to oneself in private deliberation. The new rhetoric is 
persuasion in the sense that it accommodates actively to different audiences. Central to 
Perelman's thinking are the so-called “premises”, which are, strictly speaking, mutually 
negotiated agreements between the speaker and the audience. This agreement comes from 
an “argumentation” between the two. Since the speaker must adapt his or her speech to a 
given and particular audience, the premises the speaker provides must be accepted by the 
audience through the process of argumentation in order for the speech to succeed in the 
first place. Premises thus prescribe the way the speech is structured.69   
 
In this study, the most apparent premise is naturally the notion of American 
exceptionalism. The premise has value since the notion of exceptionalism seems to be 
easily accepted by the (mainly American) audience in the era of the nation state and in the 
context of the historical construction of the United States being “a moral beacon” referred 
to in the previous chapter. But as Perelman states, rhetoric can comprise of numerous 
premises.70 Other premises in addition to exceptionalism could thus be for example the 
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66 Burke, 40–42.  
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mutually conceived status of the United States president as the undisputed leader of the 
country and his or her role in “agenda setting”. 
 
       3.2. Tools of analysis 
 
In this study, the concept of rhetoric is defined in a similar vein that Perelman does. 
President Ford's and president Carter's remarks and addresses are viewed in a perspective 
of persuasion, and in the light of how the presidents used the premise of “American 
exceptionalism”. Other factors, which are to be taken into account, are the structures that 
are framing the main premise and putting it into an historical context (that is, the situation 
of world politics and the ideological currents in the United States foreign policy thinking). 
 
These two could also be conceived as premises since they feature in the speeches of the 
presidents as well, whether referencing to historical deeds that previous presidents have 
done, or describing the hostile world of Cold War threatening America's security. The aim 
in this study is, however, to keep the focus on the notion of exceptionalism, keeping the 
other more minor premises in the background helping to paint a more accurate qualitative 
analysis. 
 
The focus of this study is based heavily on the idea of social constructivism. So, the aim is 
not to study rhetoric in its traditional and technical sense, studying president Ford's and 
president Carter's stylistic endeavors. But since the presidents are political figures, and 
their addresses certainly have persuasive political overtones, the style and structure of the 
speeches should not be completely ignored.  
 
In the heart of constructivism is language, and linguistic constructs are always rhetorical. 
The purpose of rhetorical analysis is to find out how linguistic choices and practices 
construct reality and enforce certain thought patterns.71 Thinking in terms of 
constructivism, the preconceived ideas and expectations of the hearing audience thus direct 
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the ways Ford and Carter conduct their addresses. 
 
The notion of audience is in an important role in the Perelmanian concept of rhetoric. He 
maintains that the audience, or the “gathering”, is highly changeable, ranging from private 
reflections to addressing the whole of humanity. Perelman calls the latter the “universal 
audience”, and this seems to be the closest to the audience of president Ford's and president 
Carter's speeches as well since the words of the president of the United States are of 
interest throughout the world.72 David Zarefsky, a communication scholar, suggests, 
however, that the main audience of the presidents are other politicians and the media, the 
latter serving as a filter for dispersing the utterances of the president to a larger public.73 
 
In this study, the differentiation between the universal audience and a specific audience as 
two different concepts is not really of specific concern, except in acknowledging that 
presidents Ford and Carter most definitely adapted their speeches to fit different audiences. 
From the perspective of presidents building “national unity”, however, it is more 
interesting to treat their rhetoric more of as an interplay between them and the “American 
people”. 
 
It is to be noted as well that the speeches of Ford and Carter are not tied to a certain place 
or time. Even Perelman's “universal audience” is not necessarily made up of those the 
speaker expressly addresses.74 The case of president Nixon's resignation speech on August 
8, 1974 following the Watergate proceedings provides an illuminating example of an 
audience not present in time. The audience gathered to hear Nixon's speech awaited a 
public apology from him for the misdeeds he had done for his country, but instead they 
heard Nixon defending his actions for the benefit of the future generations of Americans 
who were not present at the time of the speech, but whom it nonetheless concerned.75 
 
                                                
72 Perelman, 14. 
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74 Ibid. 
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While the focus of this study is on the persuasive perspective on rhetoric in the vein of 
Perelman, it is useful, however, to take into account Kenneth Burke's concept of 
“identification”. In contrast to Perelman, whose concept of rhetoric is very oriented on 
argumentation, Burke focuses more on the symbolic interaction between the speaker and 
the audience. “Identification” is conceived as the process of the speaker identifying the 
interests of the audience with his own. In other words, the premises that they both form, 
are mutually accepted.76  
 
Burke sees rhetoric as a dualistic concept of identification and its counterpart, division. 
Identification compensates division, which Burke sees as a more natural position among 
human beings. Rhetorical identification is thus needed to break this division, to attain a 
national unity, for example. In Burke's analysis, the argumentative techniques are not as 
apparent as in Perelman's analysis. So the speaker can easily commit to unexpected 
blunders since the process of identification makes subtle and hidden meanings possible.77 
 
Burke explores in his analysis how language and linguistic choices can affect the way 
people think through metaphors and figures of speech. Language can easily build a 
structure which could then be used to maintain existent power structures in the society or 
create something new. Thus Burke's work fits perfectly into the social constructivist view 
of international relations which emphasizes the role of language in the process of forming 
social reality.  
 
Expressions of American exceptionalism in presidential rhetoric can be ambiguous and 
symbolic. However, the notion of exceptionalism and the national sentiment, for that 
matter, are not ambiguous since they are ingrained in the mindset of American politicians 
and people through its over two hundred years of history as a nation. For the process of 
identification to work, the audience must accept the premises of the speaker as its own. So, 
the presidents must know the audience's preconceived premises of American 
exceptionalism in order their rhetoric to work.  
                                                
76 Burke, 55–59. 
77 Ibid, 20–22, 26. 
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      3.3. Public papers of the presidents as data  
 
The data used in this study comprise of the remarks and addresses of the presidents Gerald 
Ford and Jimmy Carter during the time when they held the office of the president. Since 
the aim is to analyze how the presidents used the office of the president as a rhetorical 
podium to disperse their ideas, the data under study do not include memoirs or any 
statements that the presidents made when they were for example congressmen or retired 
from the presidency, although these could be of help as secondary sources. The data does 
not include the presidents' private discourse either. Thus private negotiations, presidential 
correspondence, and communication with the White House staff and cabinet members are 
ignored. 
 
By qualitative analyzing the presidents' speeches from August 1974 to January 1981 it is 
possible to show how the presidents Ford and Carter set to invoke the notion of American 
exceptionalism in order to unite the nation suffering from the traumas of the Vietnam War 
and Watergate.  
 
The president of the United States has an immense amount of agenda-setting power among 
the American people, and this power has even been increasing in the last decades, partly in 
the wake of the rise of the modern mass media, but more because of the changing 
conceptions of presidential leadership.78 The rhetorical president engages in a discourse 
that soars above the mundane debate and invokes a loftier and more ideological discussion 
of idealism, and thus expressing an American “public philosophy”.79 Presidents are more 
and more as one with the words that they utter. It has even been suggested that speaking is 
actually governing when it comes to modern-day presidents.80 The idea of a 
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“communicative presidency” has gone so far as to treat everything that the president says 
or does with communicative value.81 
 
According to Jeffrey Tulis, it is common among the students of the American presidency to 
view the political system of the United States from the perspective of the president. The 
popularity of this “institutional partisanship” is partly merited on the influential book by 
Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power, in which he defined the title of his book first and 
foremost as a “power to persuade”.82  
 
Since this study is a rhetorical analysis of the addresses of the presidents, it cannot really 
escape the institutional partisanship and is thus necessarily president-centered. The polity 
of the United States and the structures of international politics are, however, taken into 
account to create a more systemic, and in the process, a constructivist, approach. Rhetoric 
is after all a two-way process. Examining presidential discourse in isolation is not very 
helpful because rhetoric exists in a dynamic relationship with people, policies, practices, 
and circumstances.83 The “presidential approach” is, however, generally valid because of 
the ability of the president to create and shape political reality.84  
 
4. Ideological perspectives on the United States foreign policy 
 
       4.1. Foreign policy traditions 
 
The rhetoric of the presidents Ford and Carter is analyzed in this study through the 
framework of the foreign policy traditions of the United States. These traditions direct the 
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thinking and the rhetoric of the presidents and are part of the structure in which the 
presidents are speaking and in which the rhetorical premises are “happening”. These 
traditions are in fact “the reality” to which the scholars of presidential rhetoric are referring 
to when they speak of the power that the presidents have in their words.85 In this study, the 
foreign policy traditions are viewed in light of how they relate to the concept of American 
exceptionalism. 
 
In the heart of the foreign policy traditions is the idea of “invented traditions” by Eric 
Hobsbawm. Hobsbawm defines these traditions as “a set of practices, normally governed 
by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to 
inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies 
continuity with the past.”86 
 
As one can treat the evolution of the idea of American exceptionalism (or nationalism for 
that matter) as multiple invented traditions accumulated throughout history to cover this 
“para-ideological umbrella” of exceptionalism, Hobsbawm's concept can also treat foreign 
policy traditions as “invented” in the sense that they are socially constructed readings from 
the past. By analyzing these readings it is possible to understand how the past manifests 
itself in the present.87 
 
      4.2. The old dichotomy of realism vs. idealism 
 
The foreign policy of the United States is often explained with the help of numerous 
dualistic opposites. The most common of these has been the dichotomy between realism 
and idealism, although one can often see references to either hawks or doves as well,                         
or to the position the United States should take in its relation to the world (interventionist 
and isolationist perspectives).88 
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 According to the classical realist view, the contemporary world system is suffering from 
“structural anarchy”, since there is no central authority, powerful and credible enough, to 
settle disputes between nations. Thus, national security and balance of power are at the 
forefront in the realist view of the world. Idealism (or liberalism as the tradition is also 
known) is, for its part, a worldview motivated by the idea that the state is only one of the 
most important actors in the international system, and thus it is the general international 
conditions that should shape a state's behavior.89 
 
These polar opposites of realism and idealism do not, however, represent themselves in the 
purest and the most manifest sense in the real life of international politics. In practice, no 
American policymaker ever argues that government should completely disregard moral 
values, or that it should forgo national interest.90 There is no denying that Jimmy Carter 
had national unity and national interest in mind, even though it was not expressed in realist 
terms. In a sense, moral values were Carter's own “realism”, expressing what was “real” to 
him, and what his view of the national long-term interest was. 
 
The traditions of realism and idealism can be thus very easily turned around. In fact, the 
“Realists” during the early Cold War were “idealistic” in the sense that they opposed the 
communist ideology vehemently.91 Hans Morgenthau, a realist scholar of international 
politics, has for his part stated in Politics among Nations that realism, in itself, is the 
supreme moral virtue in politics since it is based on the realities of diplomacy and the 
world as it actually works, not on some wishful thinking about how we would like it to 
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work.92 
 
Because of this fluidity in the original foreign policy traditions, Martin Griffiths has tried 
to re-evaluate the concept of realism in a more dynamic way. He states that international 
policy is “dialectical interplay between necessity and freedom, constraints and 
opportunities”.93  
  
Even though the dualistic opposites of conceiving the United States foreign policy seem 
like simplifications, they nonetheless provide the politicians, the media, the people, and the 
scholars a way of making sense of the world. Through social constructions it is useful to 
think of the different federal administrations in the history as representing different 
branches of the foreign policy traditions.94 Interestingly enough, the party system in the 
United States is also centered around a two-party system.  
 
There seems to have been discernible “mood swings” in the history of the United States 
foreign policy, and these have seemed to last around 20 or 30 years.95 According to Paul A. 
Varg, the first years of the republic saw much fluctuation. Idealism was dominant during 
the Revolution of 1776, decreased under George Washington to the promotion of American 
superiority within the established international order, and became dominant again under 
Thomas Jefferson.96 These mood swings aside, they did not seem to dissolve the broad 
consensus on the idea of American exceptionalism in the early decades of the republic.97 
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The idea of American exceptionalism is not necessarily purely idealistic, however. Walter 
A. McDougall has viewed American exceptionalism clearly from a realistic point of view 
since he does not emphasize the role of the idea of exceptionalism in the American 
expansion in the 19th century, or in the global involvement of the 20th century, for that 
matter. In fact, both could be explained through geopolitical calculation and enlightened 
self-interest.98 
 
It seems that a somewhat more dynamic view of the United States foreign relations is 
needed to break away from the old dichotomy of realism and idealism. This is provided by 
Walter Russell Mead in his 2001 work Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and 
How It Changed the World. Mead suggests that just viewing the United States foreign 
policy from the perspectives of realism and idealism does not represent adequately enough 
the American experience. The Cold War atmosphere of two rigid ideological blocs 
emphasized the dualistic view of the world and made the United Stated foreign policy 
decision makers to think in “realist” or “idealistic” terms.99  
 
Mead identifies four different schools of foreign policy traditions, which he has named 
after four figures in American history and their political legacy. These schools are not 
“blood types”, as Mead states, but rather typifications of how the ideas and values in 
American foreign policy are typically manifested. Most Americans combine different 
elements of different schools in their foreign policy thinking. 
 
Alexander Hamilton's name has been given to the school of foreign policy that sets the role 
of the American government to promote the interests of American enterprise home and 
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abroad. Opposed to the Hamiltonian policy has typically been the Jeffersonian school that 
has, in Mead's words, “seen the preservation of American democracy in a dangerous world 
as the most pressing and vital interest of the American people.” Jeffersonian tradition has 
also “consistently looked for the least costly and dangerous method of defending American 
independence while counseling against attempts to impose American values on other 
countries.” 
 
The school most relevant to this study is the foreign policy tradition that Mead calls 
“Wilsonian”. Named after Woodrow Wilson, who stated in his Fourteen Points that the 
World War I was fought for a moral cause and who called for post-war peace in Europe, 
the tradition believes that it is the moral and practical duty of the United States to spread its 
values throughout the world. The Wilsonians typically emphasize legal and moral aspects 
of world order instead of economic ones, and believe that American interests require that 
other countries accept basic American values. 
 
The final school is named after Andrew Jackson, the populist seventh president of the 
United States, who served as an army general before his presidency. The Jacksonian school 
represents a deeply embedded, populist culture of honor, independence and military pride 
among the American people. In this study, the implications of the Jacksonian tradition are 
somewhat ignored, since neither president Ford nor president Carter explicitly expressed 
Jacksonian tendencies in their policies. This was in part due to the Vietnam tragedy, which 
helped to undermine the military honor implicit in the Jacksonian tradition. 
 
There can be noted a clear divide between these four schools provided by Mead. 
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian schools are clearly more inward-looking, suggesting 
Americans to fulfill their national destiny by themselves by minding their own business 
and ignoring the rest of the world. By contrast, the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian traditions 
are both more interested in either spreading American values abroad or seeing the world in 
more global terms. In fact, the four traditions provided by Mead somewhat follow the line 
between isolationists and interventionists, as well as the line between realism and idealism. 
Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian traditions represent realism, and Jacksonian and Wilsonian 
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traditions idealism. 
 
With the help of these additions to the foreign policy traditions of the United States 
provided by Mead, it is possible to form a “kaleidoscope” of the views by which the 
United States foreign policy process can be comprehended. As Mead has noted, elements 
of all these schools, Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian, and Jacksonian, can be detected 
in a single president's policies, and thus in his rhetoric as well. This kaleidoscope is 
completed by the traditional schools of realism and idealism, and the notion of American 
exceptionalism which is at the core of this study. 
 
      4.3. Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian traditions  
 
In the cases of presidents Ford and Carter, Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian traditions (in 
addition to the Wilsonian tradition, which is covered in more detail in the next chapter), 
seem to provide a more relevant tool in the context of American exceptionalism than 
Jacksonian tradition does. Whereas Carter represented the Wilsonian moralistic tradition, 
Gerald Ford's policies and rhetoric will find most credentials from Hamiltonian and 
Jeffersonian traditions.  
 
Mead himself identifies both Nixon and Ford administrations as “Continental realism”, 
which viewed foreign policy in the sense of the 19th century European states. Moral 
considerations were not allowed to affect foreign policy decisions if they hindered the 
long-term strategy of the United States.100 This suggests that Ford could be seen as a 
Hamiltonian, although direct references are not made. Since the dismal economic situation 
and the fight against inflation was on Ford's agenda, it is possible to see more Hamiltonian 
tendencies in his rhetoric. It is to be noted that even if the United States was eager to retreat 
to preserve its democracy at home from its global hegemony after the Vietnam War in a 
Jeffersonian sense, it was much harder than previously because of its Cold War 
commitments and alliances. 
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The Hamiltonian tradition, although also identified as “realist”, differs from the 
Jeffersonian tradition in the sense that it seeks to better the United States position in the 
world by commercial means. The period after World War II could be seen as the age of the 
Hamiltonians since it saw the United States taking a leading role in the global economy 
with the formation of the Bretton Woods system.101  
 
In contrast to the Jeffersonian tradition, the Hamiltonian tradition is cosmopolitan. After 
World War II, it supported the world wide web of security treaties, with the object of 
containing the Soviet Union and of replacing the British Empire, whereas Jeffersonians 
found it hard to adjust to the decline of the British hegemony and to the new role reserved 
for the United States in the world.102 
 
Robert Kelley uses the term “Hamiltonian” in a somewhat different sense. He identifies it 
with the spirit of the Progressive Era of 1900 to 1916 that tried to eradicate links between 
wealth and government, and tackle corruption. This national progressivism was 
Hamiltonian more in a domestic policy sense, emphasizing strong elite administration, but 
was related also to the foreign policy by building up military power.103 
 
According to Mead, Hamiltonians speak the language of Continental realism with phrases 
like “the national interest” and “the balance of power” being prevalent.104 Jeffersonians, by 
contrast, speak more softly, defining their interests as narrowly as possible in order to have 
the fewest possible grounds for quarrels with others. Jeffersonians see the cultural, social, 
and political heritage of the United States as unique and highly worth conserving. The 
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country could better serve the cause of universal democracy by setting an example rather 
than imposing a model to other countries.105 
 
      4.4. Wilsonian tradition  
 
The Wilsonian tradition is closest to the idea of American exceptionalism since in its core 
is the notion that it is in America's interest to make the world as its image.106 The tradition 
is linked to the name and character of Woodrow Wilson who, during his presidency, saw 
that a new world order beneficial to the United States could be better attained by moralism, 
instead of political realism. Wilson saw that promoting universal democracy and the self-
determination of peoples based on the American model was more in the national interest of 
the United States than the policies of annexation by president William McKinley at the turn 
of the century, or the realistic vision of Wilson's predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt.107 
 
Of course, there have been “Wilsonians” shaping American foreign policy even before 
Wilson set his foot in the White House. Walter Russell Mead traces the roots of the 
tradition to the missionary movement in the early 19th century: 
 
“Beginning in 1806 with a handful of Massachusetts seminary students who asked God to 
guide their lives as they took shelter by a haystack from a sudden thunderstorm, tens of 
thousands of missionaries proceeded out of the United States to the four corners of the 
earth, determined to relieve the world's peoples of the burdens of superstition, paganism, 
feudalism and ignorance; to combat exploitation of the poor; to promote democracy, 
public health, and literacy; to reform the world's sexual mores; and to end the oppression 
of women overseas.”108 
 
These early goals of the missionaries clearly bring forth the idealism of the Wilsonian 
tradition since they are certainly not limited to foreign policy in a strict sense of 
international relations. 
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The Wilsonians have a lot in common with the British Liberals of the 19th century. British 
liberalism abolished the slave trade and its emissaries trekked the wilds of Africa sending 
punitive expeditions to put down the slave trade. In the time of Wilson, at the end of the 
World War I, when he tried to impose a peace in his own terms, his strongest allies were 
found in the British Liberal Party.109 
 
In the core of the Wilsonian tradition is the idea that democracies do not go to war with 
each other.110 Thus it seems better for the United States to promote American-style 
democracy to the far corners of the world in order to maintain a United States-led world 
order, even if that meant interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries. Wilsonians 
are for the prevention of war, but that is only the second-best object after the promotion of 
democracy.111 
 
In the daily making of foreign policy, democracies are also more practical to deal with 
from the American point of view. They make more reliable partners than whimsical 
monarchies of the past, or dictatorial tyrannies. Wilsonian foreign policy believes in long-
term global prosperity, which is naturally of use to the United States as well. Democratic 
systems provide stability. They are less prone to rapid policy reversals than autocratic 
systems, and are more likely to represent what is politically popular.112  
 
Since Wilsonianism follows the American liberal capitalist tradition, the congruency with 
the Hamiltonian tradition becomes clear. Wilsonians believe that democracies are more 
reliable than autocracies because they tend to prosper. Successful capitalism often goes 
hand in hand with the rule of law. Democratic governments are more likely over time to 
develop fair and effective legal systems.113 
 
The Wilsonian tradition seems to be a double-edged sword. In theory, its chances for 
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success seem to be limitless. If democracy can take root in what had been Nazi Germany, it 
could certainly flourish everywhere. On the other hand, Wilsonianism sets a very high bar 
for American foreign policy success. It invokes the problem of prioritizing. What global 
crises or conflicts should the United States take into account and what it should ignore?114 
Is there a chance that the United States would seed the plants of its own destruction by 
“going forth in search of monsters to destroy” and overreaching its imperial 
responsibilities?115  
 
It should be remembered that one president can represent several different foreign policy 
traditions in his rhetoric. Thus the notion of American exceptionalism can be invoked in 
different ways. Joseph Nye suggests that administrations can use different arguments to 
appeal to different camps.116  
 
This emphasizes the view that the dividing lines between the four foreign policy traditions 
sketched by Mead are extremely blurry. None of the schools is essentially monolithic. 
Among Wilsonians there are the right Wilsonians who believe that the United States as it 
currently exists has generally fulfilled the dreams of the Founding Fathers, and the radical 
Wilsonians who believe that the country is far from living up to its true values as a nation.  
 
Another point of division is the “high flyers” and the “low flyers”. High-flying Wilsonians 
look for grand programs to press the logic of their vision to its farthest conclusions, while 
lower-flying Wilsonians tend to be more specific. Even the man after whom the foreign 
policy school promoting democracy and human rights is named, Woodrow Wilson, had 
some dubious views on racism, so it is not surprising that the labeled Wilsonians have 
differences of opinion as well.117 
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5. Evolution of Cold War Rhetoric 
 
       5.1. From demonization to détente 
 
Presidential rhetoric has to take into consideration its surroundings, especially the audience 
it addresses. The audience itself has some preconceived notions around which to attach the 
address of the president. As suggested previously, one strong notion of this kind could be 
the idea of American exceptionalism, but other than that, there seems to be various 
ideological currents, or situational elements, in the foreign policy thinking of the United 
States that affect the audience and the addressing presidents as well. These elements can be 
enforced by fear, mistrust, or a need to co-operate or reconcile. More often than not, the 
world was seen on very pessimistic terms during the Cold War. Norman A. Graebner states 
that the American Cold War was a rhetorical exercise that “emerged and thrived on images 
of impending global disaster”.118  
 
President Harry S. Truman has been described as “a staunch exponent of American 
exceptionalism” who frequently referred to the United States as “the greatest nation that 
the sun ever shone upon”.119After the Second World War, Truman laid the rhetorical 
groundwork for the Cold War era that lasted from 1947 until the early 1990s and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. “Truman Doctrine” embarked on an anti-communist crusade 
invoking “supernation” rhetoric, which implied that the United States had a burden to 
make the world safe for democracy by fighting communism.120 Along with the geopolitical 
strategy of “containing”121 the Soviet Union, the rhetorical strategy of the Truman 
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administration was propaganda production and exaggerating the territorial ambitions and 
the military capabilities of the Soviet Union.122 
 
Although Truman's successor as president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, represented different 
political party than Truman, the main focus of presidential rhetoric remained the same. 
Eisenhower continued waging Cold War through his rhetoric, which served the larger goals 
of foreign and defense policy. Eisenhower was still intentionally dividing the world into 
two camps, those who lived in freedom and those who were under the slavery of 
communism.123 
 
More tangible change came when John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency. Faced with a 
stalemate with the Soviet Union, Kennedy decided to give a clear message of willingness 
to negotiate, while at the same time tried to maintain the military strength of the nation. 
Vito N. Silvestri states that John F. Kennedy was a transitional president who attempted to 
secure peace by steering away from hardline Cold War positions into situations where 
negotiating was more plausible. In that process, Kennedy was spreading the idea of 
freedom and liberty throughout the world, which could be linked to American values and 
human rights principles.  
 
The focus was more on the individual. One of the most quotable statements of Kennedy 
was when he said in his Inaugural Address in 1961: “Ask not what your country can do for 
you; ask what you can do for your country.”124 However, he did not forget to use rhetorical 
devices of exceptionalism in the same speech: “Let every nation know, whether it wishes 
us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any 
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friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”125 
 
Lyndon B. Johnson's foreign policy rhetoric was focused on the war in Vietnam, and the 
tone was defensive. The president was balancing between securing peace in Vietnam and 
avoiding humiliating defeat for the United States.126 According to Windt, Johnson did not 
declare war against another country, but against those who would threaten America's 
credibility and those who would challenge Johnson's own will to maintain that 
credibility.127 However, traces of exceptionalism could be noted. Johnson suggested that 
the moral superiority of the United States purpose and the purity of its conduct would 
ultimately ensure victory for the country in Vietnam: “Because we fight for values and we 
fight for principles, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are 
unending.”128 
 
Richard Nixon's rhetoric emphasized the unity of Americans in the tumultuous domestic 
situation of civil rights demands, and the ongoing battle in Vietnam that a vocal part of 
American public thought of as vain. As a strategist, rather than political opportunist, he 
continued the United States presence in Vietnam stating that it served the national interest 
in the long term.129 
 
During Nixon's presidency, the conditions were right for a new strategy of containment. 
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The relationship between the two major communist countries, the Soviet Union and China, 
was hostile, and by the time Nixon's first term as the president was drawing to its close in 
1972, the communist countries were competing for Washington's favor.130  
 
Contrary to his predecessors, Nixon was a realist preaching for the balance of power 
between nations.131 His rhetoric and policies did not serve very well the idea of American 
exceptionalism in its strictest sense of the United States being qualitatively different from 
other states. His role as the president was to realize the diminishing status of the America 
in the world political scene and to guide it through the transition from dominance to 
leadership.132  
 
The United States had lost its nuclear superiority, and simultaneously the access to nuclear 
weapons on each side of the Cold War blocs brought the world closer to a nuclear war and 
a possibility for the annihilation of mankind.133 This made way for détente to come forth, 
and the idea of American exceptionalism retreated to the background, although still 
surviving the Nixon period intact. The ideas of economic freedom, individualism, and 
liberty still remained central to the American belief system.134  
 
       5.2. From moralizing to exceptional confidence 
 
After Richard Nixon resigned from the presidency in August 1974 following the Watergate 
scandal, his vice-president Gerald Ford took over the presidency. When it came to choose 
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between preserving the “balance of power” Nixon had worked on, or cementing his foreign 
policy on moral imperatives on American exceptionalism, Ford continued where Nixon 
had left off. The foreign policy of Gerald Ford was largely determined by strategic, 
political and economic interests.135 
 
After the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, the American public's faith in the moral 
legitimacy of their nation was severely shaken. Gerald Ford's task as the president was to 
restore that faith and to boost confidence into Americans. He also had to convince the allies 
and the enemies of the United States that the country would not retreat into isolation.136 
 
Ford's successor Jimmy Carter acknowledged that Ford had done much to begin the 
healing process, yet throughout his election campaign he did not believe that Ford had 
done enough to restore American confidence. Carter believed that the traditional beliefs at 
the very heart of what it meant to be an American had been thrown into question by years 
of lies, failure, and corruption by the government.137 
 
The purpose of Carter was to continue the healing process, and to unify the nation in the 
process. Promoting human rights was for Carter embracing the true American mission and 
national self. Human rights initiative was also a direct response to the crisis of faith in 
American values. It was also a purification of sorts. It restored the prestige of the United 
States.138 
 
In addition to emphasizing human rights, Carter tried to steer away from the old, 
geopolitical superpower competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. It 
was still important for the United States to be ahead of the Soviet Union, but that goal 
would no longer dominate the agenda of global relations. Nation states in the developing 
world were acquiring a more important role in world affairs. The rise of transnational 
organizations, global communication networks, and increasingly interdependent global 
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economy all forced Carter to approach his foreign policy by trying to cooperate with, rather 
than dominate others.139 
 
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Carter's rhetoric was swinging to a 
new hardline. The president retreated from détente, and imposed sanctions for the Soviet 
Union.140 This freezing in the Cold War laid the platform open for the next president, 
Ronald Reagan, who brought back the ideological containment and increased defense 
spending.141 
 
Reagan subscribed to American exceptionalism wholeheartedly. He believed that the 
American values and principles were sought after by all the people of the world. Whereas 
Carter tried to make the nation to accept certain limits to what Americans could rightfully 
do, Reagan denied the necessity of any redemption. Because the United States was for 
Reagan a morally superior nation, it followed that whatever it did was for the good for the 
world.142 The phrase “shining city on the hill” became a mantra for Reagan.143 
 
Reagan tried to restore faith in American principles by recovering the military supremacy 
of the United States, and by encouraging free enterprise.144 During his first term as the 
president, he often emphasized the strength and morality of the United States, and 
compared it with what he regarded as the morally, spiritually, and economically bankrupt 
Soviet system.145 Reagan described the Soviet Union as an “evil empire”, but since by the 
year 1984 the American confidence had been restored, and the economic recovery was in 
full swing, he was now ready for a more conciliatory approach when it came to the Soviet 
Union.146  
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The last Cold War era president George H.W. Bush, who was also Reagan's vice-president, 
did not have a need to present a new, drastic vision to restore any lost spirit or confidence 
as 1980s turned to its close. His task was to preserve the status quo. which Reagan had 
worked for. Still, many of his speeches contained rhetorical references to American 
exceptionalism as well.147 
 
6. Gerald Ford's exceptionalism in an interdependent world 
 
       6.1. Language of exceptionalism 
 
Before reaching a conclusion on which foreign policy traditions Gerald Ford was closest to 
in his rhetoric, it is useful to find some patterns in his speeches that fall under the spectrum 
of using the rhetoric of American exceptionalism.  
 
Ford did not give an “inaugural address” as such that is customary to the new presidents of 
the United States, since he was not elected as the president. Instead, on August 9, 1974, he 
addressed the nation with “just a little straight talk among friends”, as he described.148 
 
Taking his oath of office, Ford already gave away snippets of his “exceptional” rhetoric 
that were to come. He emphasized freedom and the search for peace, and invoked the 
Founding Fathers by quoting Thomas Jefferson who “said the people are the only sure 
reliance for the preservation of our liberty.” He also stressed God's role in determining 
what was right for the man: “our great Republic is a government of laws and not of men. 
Here the people rule. But there is a higher Power, by whatever name we honor Him, who 
ordains not only righteousness but love, not only justice but mercy.”149 Overall, the tone in 
his remarks on taking the oath of office was very defensive and modest. After all, Ford's 
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ascendancy to the presidency was an era of all-time low for the United States because of 
the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. 
 
Ford's first months as president were overwhelmed by a poor state of the economy, which 
he made clear in his first annual State of the Union Address in January 1975: “...the state of 
the Union is not good: Millions of Americans are out of work. Recession and inflation are 
eroding the money of millions more… We depend on others for essential energy.”150 Ford 
used “exceptional” rhetoric in his first State of the Union Address to restore confidence in 
the American people. He was also now, five months after Nixon's resignation, willing to 
give the United States its familiar role as the leader of the free world:  
 
“This is not a moment for the American people to turn inward. More than ever before, our 
own well-being depends on America's determination and America's leadership in the 
whole wide world. We are a great Nation--spiritually, politically, militarily, diplomatically, 
and economically. America's commitment to international security has sustained the 
safety of allies and friends in many areas--in the Middle East, in Europe, and in Asia. Our 
turning away would unleash new instabilities, new dangers around the globe, which, in 
turn, would threaten our own security.”151 
 
Using “exceptional” rhetoric in economic matters was useful, since the American public 
was able to take part in determining the path on which the economy was taking by being 
informed consumers. Ford encouraged citizens to conserve energy to help the country not 
being so dependent on foreign oil. The idea was to reassure Americans that they could take 
matters in their own hands.152 Ford emphasized the exceptional spirit of the American 
people in the fight against inflation:  
 
“The American people have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to submerge personal 
and group interests to the general welfare. When they know the chips are down, they are 
really down--and they have done it in the past, and they will do it again--they will respond 
as they always have. The most important weapon in the fight against inflation is the spirit 
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of the American people. This spirit is no secret weapon; it is renowned all over the 
world.”153 
 
The president launched his anti-inflation campaign to rally the nation around his policies in 
his October 8, 1974 address to the Congress, which came to be known as his “Whip 
Inflation Now” speech.154 
 
In addition to invoking the Founding Fathers when he was taking the oath of office, the 
president returned to the theme now and then. This was particularly common in 1975 and 
1976 around the time when the United States was celebrating its bicentennial 
anniversary.155 Ford described the United States Declaration of Independence and the 
United States constitution as “two of the greatest documents ever devised by man.”156 
Addressing the Continental Congress of the Daughters of American Revolution Ford 
declared: 
 
“Call it Divine Providence or call it destiny, 13 small colonies clustered along the Atlantic 
coast somehow managed to produce one of the most brilliant generations of leaders 
known to history--the soldiers, the statesmen we know as the founders of this great 
country.  
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But even more remarkable than the genius of the founders themselves is the fact that 
generation after generation of Americans have continued to build on the foundation that 
they left us. Fortunately for us and for the world, we have never lost sight of their great 
dream.”157 
 
Common rhetorical device that helped to bring forth “exceptional” sentiments in the 
American public was to reference past American presidents and leaders, in addition to the 
Founding Fathers. Quoting former presidents becomes a ritual to instill nationalistic values 
and to build familiar continuity with the (successful) past. The former presidents become 
symbols for America's exceptional past.158 The device was used by Ford at the end of his 
State of the Union Address in January 1976: 
 
“I have heard many inspiring Presidential speeches, but the words I remember best were 
spoken by Dwight D. Eisenhower. "America is not good because it is great," the President 
said. "America is great because it is good."  
President Eisenhower was raised in a poor but religious home in the heart of America. His 
simple words echoed President Lincoln's eloquent testament that "right makes might." 
And Lincoln in turn evoked the silent image of George Washington kneeling in prayer at 
Valley Forge.”159 
 
The underlying idea behind invoking the heroes of the American Revolution was that, in a 
sense, the revolution was still in process. Ford's America needed new American heroes to 
survive the low point in America's exceptional status. President's rhetoric was supportive 
and encouraged confidence: “In a sense, our American Revolution was never ended. We 
are unique people in that we are at the same time eminently practical and incurably 
idealistic.”160  
 
According to Colleen Shogan, the presidents of the United States often use moral and 
religious rhetoric as a strategic exercise of power. Religious rhetoric is of particularly good 
use because it has the ability to connect “the pragmatism of policy to the passion of 
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emotions”.161  
 
Since the Puritan settlers of the 17th century through American history, religion has played 
an influential role in American society. According to a study from 2010, Americans have 
become more religious, not less, since the end of Civil War in 1865.162  
 
Shogan states that the use of moral and religious rhetoric can be of effective use if the 
president wants the nation to rally around a particular cause.163 President Ford aspired to 
unite the nation and raise its spirit in the fight against inflation, and to distract the nation's 
memory from the humiliating legacy of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Just 
three days into his presidency on August 12, 1974, he ended the Address to the Joint 
Session of Congress by saying that “We all need God's sure guidance. With it, nothing can 
stop the United States of America.”164 Ford also used a technique of linking the United 
States pre-Vietnam and pre-Watergate success to God's direction and guidance: “And God 
helps those who help themselves. On this principle, Americans in two centuries have 
astonished the world and, time and time again, have confounded the pessimists and the 
cynics who said it couldn't be done.”165 
 
Although quantitative content analysis has not been used in this study to determine how the 
presidents used American exceptionalism in their rhetoric, it is to be noted that during the 
latter half of his presidency, Gerald Ford did not refer to religion, or to God, as directly and 
explicitly as he did during those early months when he was trying to restore the confidence 
of the American public. From the spring of 1976 onwards, he very often emphasized the 
exceptional morality and spirituality of the United States. In a speech on March 27, 1976 
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Ford declared: 
 
“We have the greatest science and technology capability in the history of mankind. Our 
military capability is second to none. But there is one thing that is even more important 
than all of that. America is morally and spiritually number one, and that will be the 
driving force to keep us moving so that America and all its people, its government, will be 
number one forever.”166 
 
Emphasizing the moral and spiritual strength of the United States was a common reference 
when Ford was addressing his campaign volunteers in the spring of 1976. In his remarks to 
his committee volunteers in Milwaukee on April 2, 1976 he stated that “the great strength 
of America is its moral and spiritual leadership.”167 In another address on the same day in 
Wisconsin he stated that “no other nation can match us... in the combined economic, 
agricultural, technological, military, and more importantly, moral strength of the United 
States of America.”168 Rhetoric of this kind repeated itself in Ford's speeches throughout 
the spring.169 At a President Ford committee breakfast in Dallas he expressed the linkage 
between the American spirit and freedom:  
 
“And then there is one final ingredient that I think makes a difference to all of us. In the 
United States of America, we have a great devotion to spiritual, religious, deep-seated 
convictions about what we can do and who we believe in and what our feelings are 
toward something greater than we, greater than anything. And that spiritual religious 
conviction gives us the inspiration to keep going, to make this freedom secure and this 
liberty positive and certain and to make America what we want as our dream--the 
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America that our forefathers gave us but improved and added to and just made better by 
all of us.”170 
 
It is to be taken into account, as Shogan suggests, that much of the genres of presidential 
rhetoric (Inaugural Addresses, Farewell Addresses, State of the Union Addresses) routinely 
include moral and spiritual elements.171 Putting too much emphasis on religious themes in 
presidential rhetoric does not provide a clear picture of exceptional presidential rhetoric. 
Although Ford had kept his religious rhetoric somewhat toned down in the latter half of his 
presidency, he remembered, however, to return to America's religious roots in his last State 
of the Union Address in January 1977, after having lost the presidential election to Jimmy 
Carter the previous year: 
 
“My fellow Americans, I once asked you for your prayers, and now I give you mine: May 
God guide this wonderful country, its people, and those they have chosen to lead them. 
May our third century be illuminated by liberty and blessed with brotherhood, so that we 
and all who come after us may be the humble servants of thy peace. Amen. Good night. 
God bless you.”172 
 
There are some phrases or mantras that often feature in “exceptional” rhetoric. The most 
common of these are usually listed as  “manifest destiny”, “city on a hill”, “American 
dream”, “beacon of light/hope” or “new world order”.173 In the wake of the downfall of 
South Vietnam's capital, Saigon, in April 1975, Ford did not accept the beacon to be put out 
easily:  
 
“Let the beacon light of the past shine forth from historic New Orleans and from Tulane 
University and from every other corner of this land to illuminate a boundless future for all 
Americans and a peace for all mankind.”174  
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The concept of “American Dream” was a useful rhetorical tool during the times of 
economic woes:  
 
“Without the dedication of millions of men and women willing to roll up their sleeves and 
go to work, the American dream would remain only that--a dream. With that dedication 
and hard work, America has developed over the last 200 years into not only the most 
prosperous of nations but an enduring example of the democratic process and spirit.”175 
 
       6.2. Ford, Hamiltonian realist 
 
When Gerald Ford became president after Nixon’s resignation, he had to look at the United 
States’ status in the world politics through a realistic lens. The Vietnam war was lost, the 
Watergate scandal had just happened, the economy was bad, and the confidence was low. 
In his oath of office Ford emphasized freedom and the search for peace, and quoted 
Thomas Jefferson.176 It was time to be a Jeffersonian, and take consolation in the cultural, 
social, and political heritage of the United States. 
 
However, after five months of being president, the tone started to be more assertive again. 
While the United States could not step down from the world, the defensive and modest 
rhetoric started to give way to a more confident one. Ford’s rhetoric turned from a more 
Jeffersonian one, emphasizing deep American values and heritage, to a more Hamiltonian 
one, with the American global economic leadership at its core. This was still done by 
sticking to the idea of American exceptionalism. 
 
Talking in the long aftermath of economic troubles after the 1973 oil embargo in February 
1975, Ford stated: 
 
”Only by cooperative efforts among the major industrial nations and a constructive dialog 
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with the oil producers can an equitable oil price be restored. Only by new mechanisms of 
cooperation and mutual support can the industrial democracies safeguard their economies 
against a new embargo or international financial disruption. Only if the United States 
takes the lead now will our partners have any hope of an ultimate solution or an incentive 
to commit themselves to cooperation with us.”177 
 
As described by Mead, in the interests of Hamiltonianism lies the spreading of American 
values abroad, and promoting the interests of American enterprise home and abroad.178 
Ford was emphasizing that the economic system was becoming more and more 
interdependent, and the United States had its role in the system as the leader, through 
foreign aid, for example:  
 
”Developing and developed countries are all part of a single, interdependent economic 
system.… 
First, foreign aid is a part of the price we must pay to achieve the kind of a world in which 
we want to live. Let's be frank about it. Foreign aid bolsters our diplomatic efforts for 
peace and for security.  
But secondly, and perhaps just as importantly, even with a recession, we remain the 
world's most affluent country. And the sharing of our resources today is the right, the 
humane, and the decent thing to do. And we will.”179 
 
The need for the American leadership was taken up at the annual State of the Union 
Address of 1975 as well, where the president’s words receive the most attention. Ford 
announced that ”this is not a moment for the American people to turn inward. More than 
ever before, our own well-being depends on America's determination and America's 
leadership in the whole wide world.”180 
 
A year on, and the need for American economic leadership was made even more explicit: 
 
”But we have responsibilities around the world that fall on our shoulders. Not that we 
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necessarily in every instance want them, but fate has decreed that the United States has a 
responsibility to work with our allies, to negotiate with our adversaries, to help the less 
advantaged, to make this globe in which we live not only a better place for us but a better 
place for all people.”181 
 
Looking at the ”kaleidoscope” of different foreign policy traditions provided by Mead, it 
seems that Gerald Ford’s rhetoric, besides invoking American exceptionalism by nature, 
was falling for the most part within the realm of Hamiltonian rhetoric. Ford’s policy goals 
were Hamiltonian, and so was the context level of his rhetoric.  
 
There can still be noted traces of Jeffersonianism, especially through the beginning of his 
term in the office. It seems like after the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, being 
Jeffersonian was the most natural thing to do. Ford affirmed a healing nation that was 
looking inward and valuing those things that were said to be dear and unique to the 
American experiment: freedom, hard work, and God’s guidance. 
 
After a year or so, president Ford’s rhetoric was, however, turning more Hamiltonian, 
emphasizing the global interconnectedness of economy and America’s leading role in it. 
Here the historical idea of the United States being exceptional did not play only a small 
part. It was easy to turn into more assertive rhetoric since the historical belief of America 
being such a great country was so strong. 
 
7. Jimmy Carter’s Wilsonian exceptionalism 
 
       7.1. Language of exceptionalism 
 
Taking a closer look at the language Jimmy Carter used to address the American public, it 
can be noted that he did not divert from the path of invoking the rhetoric of American 
exceptionalism. In his Inaugural Address, Carter stated that the United States had 
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”exceptional appeal” which also imposed moral obligations to the country.182 
 
In his rhetoric, Carter proposed a spiritual renewal of America’s role in the world, which 
would again serve as an augmentation of its power. This renewal was to come by 
emphasizing human rights and human aspirations of all the people in the world.183 On 
assuming office he conveyed a message to the other nations that the United States had a 
“desire to shape a world order that is more responsive to human aspirations”.184 In his first 
State of the Union Address a year later in January 1978, he reiterated the nation’s identity: 
“We've restored a moral basis for our foreign policy. The very heart of our identity as a 
nation is our firm commitment to human rights.”185  
 
As Kane has suggested, Carter made human rights the cornerstone of his foreign policy in 
order to reinstate and restore popular belief in American exceptionalism.186 In his rhetoric, 
there were clear signs of exemplar exceptionalism: “… to set a new standard in the 
preservation of human rights throughout the world. I don't intend to yield on this position, 
because I think it represents what our Nation is and what the world ought to be.”187  
 
Carter also linked American values to human rights when he addressed the United Nations 
General Assembly: “I believe that this is a foreign policy that is consistent with my own 
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Nation's historic values and commitments.”188 To the Organization of American States he 
promised not to “act abroad in ways that we would not tolerate at home in our own 
country”.189 In October 1977, he went as far as comparing the actions of the United States 
to the work of the United Nations: “our Nation for the last 200 years has, in effect, done 
what the United Nations has done in the last 32 years. I hope that your organization, the 
United Nations, can also learn from the great experience of what I still consider to be the 
greatest country on Earth, the United States.”190 
 
Carter was insistent that the United States should again lead by example with a strength 
“based not merely on the size of an arsenal but on the nobility of ideas”.191 In Carter’s 
rhetoric, the United States was “the beacon light” that was to give an example to the world 
to follow. Addressing the Democratic National Committee on April 28,1977, he stated that 
the United States was “… kind of a beacon light for the rest of the world, based on basic 
human rights and on the free enterprise system and on the right of individuals to make our 
own decisions and to control our own government”.192 He also referred to the United States 
as a “symbol of liberty to all the world”.193 
 
                                                
188 Carter, Jimmy: ”United Nations - Address Before the General Assembly”, March 17, 1977. Public Papers 
of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 
Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7183 (accessed 18.4.2016). 
189 Carter, Jimmy: ”Organization of American States Address Before the Permanent Council”, April 14, 
1977. Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 
The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7347 (accessed 18.4.2016). 
190 Carter, Jimmy: “United Nations Remarks to Members of the U.S. Delegation and U.S. Officials of the 
United Nations Secretariat”, October 4, 1977. Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6747 (accessed 18.4.2016) 
191 McCrisken, 60. 
192 Carter, Jimmy: ”Democratic National Committee - Remarks at a Luncheon for Members of the 
Committee's National Finance Council”, April 28, 1977. Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 
1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7414 (accessed 18.4.2016). 
193 Carter, Jimmy: “Memphis, Tennessee Remarks at the Opening Session of the 1978 National Democratic 
Party Conference”, December 8, 1978.  Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1978. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30285 (accessed 18.4.2016). 
 51 
During the year 1977, Carter referred to the “beacon” expression on several occasions, 
interestingly mostly when he was addressing his fellow party members in various events 
for Democratic politicians. At a Democratic Congressional Dinner in May he stated: “I 
think the American people now sense that our country stands for things that are decent and 
honest and upright; that we have once again become a beacon light for peace and for 
hope…”194 And a month or so later: “We've established, working with many other people, 
a basic commitment to human rights, and now I think our Nation stands as a beacon light 
so that we can be proud of ourselves…”195 
 
According to Carter, the exemplary appeal of the United States was so strong that he used 
the word “hunger” to describe the willingness of other nations to become like America: “… 
there's an innate hunger among the human beings who inhabit this Earth for a right to make 
their own decisions, not to be abused by government, to be free to develop as they choose, 
to be treated fairly. And I think in this way, our system of government can be exemplary to 
others.”196 
 
Carter did not mention the Founding Fathers as often as Ford, most likely because the 200th 
anniversary of the United States had already passed in 1976. Still, referring implicitly to 
the statesmen who guided the nation through its first years was not uncommon for Carter. 
To Carter, they were the ones who “200 years ago risked their lives to spell out a unique 
dream in the world; that America stands for something clean and worthy of protection, yes; 
of pride, yes; but of trust and emulation”.197  
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It has been suggested that Carter’s dedication to emphasizing human rights and his high 
moral principles stemmed from him being deeply religious. Rick Hertzberg, president’s 
chief speechwriter has stated that “Carter did not have a political ideology. He had a set of 
moral precepts, he had a moral ideology”.198 Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, believes that Carter’s constant commitment to human rights during his 
presidency reflected his religious beliefs which made him a man of genuine dedication to 
principle.199 
 
Of course Carter used also religious rhetoric to emphasize the exceptional character of the 
United States. God had reserved a special providence for the United States, which was 
used by Carter as a tool in trying to unite the American nation for a common cause. It 
seems that Carter was referring to God’s guidance more as his term as president went on. 
On December 17, 1977, Carter addressed the Business Council: “We’ve got the greatest 
country on Earth. We’ve got the best economic system on Earth. It’s been stable and part of 
our lives for 200 years. God has blessed us with unequaled natural resources.”200 In 
Carter’s rhetoric, The United States was blessed by God with “the free enterprise system 
that encourages initiative”.201 Later, he was being even more specific when it came to 
God’s blessings:  
 
“God’s blessed us in many wonderful ways, with rich land, a democratic, free 
government, a pride in the individualism of each person, the right to be different, the right 
to speak our minds, the right to control our own Government, the right to unify ourselves 
in times of challenge- and I have to say that this is one of those times when our people 
must be unified.”202 
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Zbigniew Brzezinski’s view, that Carter’s commitment to human rights was also a 
politically expedient way to draw a sharp contrast to the policies of Nixon and Kissinger, 
can be seen in his rhetoric as well: 
 
“But in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate and the CIA revelations, our Nation’s 
reputation was soiled. Many Americans turned away from our own Government and said, 
“It embarrasses me.” The vision, the ideal, the commitment that were there 200 years ago 
when our Nation was formed, have somehow been lost. One of the great responsibilities 
that I share with you is to restore that vision and that degree of cleanness and decency and 
honesty and truth and principle to our country.”203 
 
The Iranian Revolution in 1978 and 1979 decreased oil output from the region, and thus 
affected the prices of energy in the United States. On July 15, 1979, Carter reached out to 
the American public with his much-anticipated address to the nation on “Energy and 
National Goals”.  He felt it was an occasion to give an honest account of what he 
considered the “moral and spiritual crisis” that had gripped the nation. He declared that the 
America and its people were threatened by a “crisis of confidence”.204 Therefore, the 
speech came to be known as the “malaise speech”. Carter lamented the current landscape 
of American moral values: 
 
“In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families, close-knit communities, and our 
faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption. 
Human identity is no longer defined by what one does, but by what one owns. But we’ve 
discovered that owning things and consuming things does not satisfy our longing for 
meaning. We’ve learned that piling up material goods cannot fill the emptiness of lives 
which have no confidence or purpose. The symptoms of this crisis of the American spirit 
are all around us.”205 
 
                                                
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32783 (accessed 
18.4.2016). 
203 Carter, Jimmy: “Atlantic City, New Jersey Remarks at a Democratic Party Campaign Luncheon”, 
September 20, 1978. Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1978. Online by Gerhard Peters and John 
T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29810 
(accessed 18.4.2016); McCrisken, 67. 
204 McCrisken, 73. 
205 Carter, Jimmy: ”Address to the Nation on Energy and National Goals: "The Malaise Speech"”, July 15, 
1979. Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1979. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 
The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32596 (accessed 18.4.2016) . 
 54 
John Kane has linked the “malaise speech” with Carter’s religiosity: the malaise was the 
result of the sin into which the United States had fallen by virtue of its Cold War policy.206 
Although the overall tone of the speech could have been interpreted as quite pessimistic, 
Carter was again using the language of American exceptionalism in order to end the speech 
in a positive note, and to unite the nation behind his policies: 
 
“We know the strength of America. We are strong. We can regain our unity. We can regain 
our confidence. We are the heirs of generations who survived threats much more powerful 
and awesome than those that challenge us now. Our fathers and mothers were strong men 
and women who shaped a new society during the Great Repression, who fought world 
wars, and who carved out a new chapter of peace for the world.”207 
 
For Carter, energy became the “immediate test of our ability to unite this Nation”. He 
continued: “On the battlefield of energy we can win for our Nation a new confidence, and 
we can seize control again of our common destiny.”208 
 
As the Carter presidency went on, his rhetoric became more assertive. This seems to be in 
line with the various challenges and problems that were accumulating simultaneously at 
the time (Iranian revolution, rising oil prices, inflation, unemployment, Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, Iran hostage crisis). It became common for Carter to acknowledge the 
problems America was facing, but at the same time he more often started to emphasize 
America’s exceptional qualities. In his 1980 State of the Union Address, he declared:  
 
”This last few months has not been an easy time for any of us. As we meet tonight, it has 
never been more clear that the state of our Union depends on the state of the world. And 
tonight, as throughout our own generation, freedom and peace in the world depend on the 
state of our Union.”209 
 
Carter started to refer to the United States more often in superlative descriptions: 
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”We do have some problems with energy, with confidence, with inflation, with some 
remaining unemployment, lot of other things, but we must never forget that America is 
the strongest and the brightest and the best nation on Earth, and we’ve got more to be 
thankful for than we have to complain about.”210 
 
On some occasions, he was more specific on America’s qualities: 
 
”Militarily, we’re the greatest, strongest nation on Earth. Politically, we’re the greatest 
nation on Earth. Our system of economics, based on the individuality of human beings 
and an innate freedom and competition, is the greatest, I think, on Earth.”211 
 
Besides these qualities, in Carter’s rhetoric the United States was unsurpassed in moral and 
ethical terms as well, which reflected Carter’s foreign policy strategy of emphasizing 
human rights: “Our economic strength, our military strength, our political strength, our 
ethical strength, our moral strength are unsurpassed by any other nation on Earth.”212 
 
Mead suggests that following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Carter’s foreign 
policy ideology switched from emphasizing human rights and the exemplary qualities of 
the United States to ideological anticommunism.213 The “Carter doctrine” emerged: it 
promised to defend America’s vital interests whenever and wherever threatened, militarily 
if necessary.214 
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Although the foreign policy environment had radically changed within just a few months 
due to the various foreign policy shocks of 1979, Carter’s rhetoric stayed “exceptional”. 
One other rhetorical premise had, however, changed. Carter was increasingly being seen as 
failing to lead the nation. In June 1979, only 28 per cent approved his performance as the 
president.215 Colleen Shogan suggests that in a policy environment like this, it is difficult 
for a president to serve as a moral leader because of the lack of a steady political regime 
behind the decisions.216 
 
During the Iran hostage crisis at the turn of the year 1980, Carter’s approval rating 
increased again to levels between 50 and 60 per cent.217 This increase was mainly the result 
of Carter showing a very tough stance against the Iranians.218 But as the hostage situation 
wore on without a solution, the American public became frustrated at president’s inability 
to free the hostages, and among other problems facing the nation, it led to Carter’s defeat to 
Ronald Reagan in November 1980 presidential elections.219 In his Farewell Address to the 
nation, Carter linked human rights again to the American values: “If we are to serve as a 
beacon for human rights, we must continue to perfect here at home the rights and the 
values which we espouse around the world.”220 
 
       7.2. Carter, Wilsonian idealist 
 
Jimmy Carter came to the White House emphasizing human rights promotion 
internationally as his policy goal. He felt this was necessary after years of foreign policy 
failures he attributed to the Nixon and Ford administrations.221 The world was also 
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changing radically, becoming more and more interconnected with a variety of new foreign 
policy actors.  
 
Decolonization had unleashed nationalist movements throughout the world that did not fit 
neatly into the archaic Cold War bipolar system. India’s testing of a nuclear device in 1974 
had raised questions about nuclear proliferation in non-aligned countries. The energy crisis 
and the OPEC oil embargo had shown that the security interests of the United States 
extended beyond the traditional rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The rise of transnational organizations, global communication networks and the 
interdependent global economy all called for a more complex foreign policy that could take 
these changes into account, but still allowed the continued leadership of the United 
States.222 
  
All this made drafting a successful foreign policy formula more challenging since events in 
the global world started to become more and more difficult to predict. Carter observed: “It 
is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy… We can no longer expect that 
the other 150 nations will follow the dictates of the powerful, but we must continue –
confidently– our efforts to inspire, to persuade, and to lead.”223  
 
In a world like this, Carter was hesitant to impose America’s will on other nations in order 
to avoid a possible new war overseas, as the Vietnam War was. On assuming office, he 
declared: “The United States will meet its obligation to help create a stable, just, and 
peaceful world order. We will not seek to dominate nor dictate to others.”224  
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Carter’s foreign policy goals were more oriented towards co-operation rather than 
domination and coercion.225 Addressing the United Nations General Assembly, Carter 
proposed to “build a better and a more cooperative international economic system… to 
work with potential adversaries as well as our close friends to advance the cause of human 
rights”.226 In his State of the Union Address in January 1979, he stated: “This demand for 
justice and human rights is a wave of the future. In such a world, the choice is not which 
super power will dominate the world. None can and none will. The choice instead is 
between a world of anarchy and destruction, or a world of cooperation and peace.”227 
 
Carter’s new opening in foreign policy thinking also reflected the thawing in the 
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and made it possible to de-
emphasize the confrontation between the two Cold War superpowers.228 At the same time it 
allowed for tactical expediency in accusing the Soviet Union for its human rights 
violations, thus enabling Carter to wage the Cold war on a different front.229 Despite 
setting a new standard in American foreign policy, Carter could not have let it to infringe 
upon America’s national interest.230 
 
The core features of Wilsonian foreign policy tradition are America’s interest in making the 
world as its image, and the supposition that democracies do not go to war with each 
other.231 It has, according to Mead, the “moral and practical duty to spread its values 
through the world”.232 Henry Kissinger states that “(Woodrow) Wilson’s innovation was to 
translate what had been heretofore conceived as a “shining city on the hill”, inspiring 
others by moral example, into a crusade to spread these values by an active foreign 
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policy”.233 
 
Carter’s rhetoric often propagated missionary exceptionalism:  
 
“Our Nation is the strongest on Earth. It’s the strongest militarily, and it’s going to stay 
that way. It’s the strongest politically, because we believe in the dignity of every human 
being, the right of people to stand on their own feet, to make their own decisions, to 
control their own government, to let their own individuality be expressed. And we’re 
trying to spread this philosophy, this commitment, these ideals around the world.”234  
 
Applying Mead’s “kaleidoscope” again to Carter’s rhetoric, the data shows that he falls 
safely under the Wilsonian tradition. His policy goals were Wilsonian, as well as the 
rhetoric by which he tried to attain them. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter both appealed to American exceptionalism in their rhetoric. 
They both routinely invoked exceptional themes and used exceptional language, although 
they used them in different ways and with different policy goals. This suggests that in the 
framework of American politics, it does not matter whether the president comes from the 
Republican or the Democratic party, he or she will use exceptional rhetoric to his or her 
advantage. 
 
After Richard Nixon’s resignation as president, Ford stepped up as Nixon’s vice-president 
to lead the country among a feeling of national embarrassment and division resulting from 
the failed war efforts in Vietnam. The trust of the American public towards its leaders was 
also drastically low because of the government secrecy and the Watergate scandal. 
 
Ford started his task of “healing the nation” by looking inwards at the exceptional qualities 
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that the United States had possessed for 200 years and which it still held in high regard. In 
his speeches he emphasized freedom, search for peace and God. Since the United States 
was celebrating its bicentennial in 1976, Ford was often citing the Founding Fathers of the 
nation or some former presidents, for example Abraham Lincoln. 
 
Besides recovering from the depressed mood of the Vietnam War and Watergate, the 
economic situation was bad. The first OPEC oil crisis in 1973 had hit the United States 
hard and the inflation was running high. Ford’s message to the public was a reassuring one: 
America was a great country, had been that for 200 years, and was now calling on its 
people to make it great again.  
 
Ford wanted America to take back its status as the unquestionable leader of the free world 
although its reputation had suffered a blow in recent years. The president made clear how 
important is was for the United States to act in a leading role in world politics. Applying 
Walter Russell Mead’s four different foreign policy traditions to Gerald Ford’s rhetoric, it 
seems that the Jeffersonian outlook of looking inward and appreciating the values of the 
United States of the first months turned into a more Hamiltonian approach, which is as a 
foreign policy approach more pragmatic and realist. Ford’s goal was to restore the 
historical confidence that had always been part of the identity of the United States, and to 
be confident, the country needed to be united for a common cause. 
 
Jimmy Carter had a similar vision. He acknowledged that Ford had started the healing 
process, but still regarded him just continuing the policy path set by Nixon. Carter’s 
foreign policy goals were something totally new. He believed that the United States should 
build its foreign policy on human rights, human aspirations, democracy and all the people 
of the world’s willingness to decide upon their own lives. The United States could serve as 
an example and lead the world by that example since the universal values of human rights 
were close to the values found in the United States constitution. Moving the focus on 
human rights was also a convenient way to wage rhetorical Cold War against the Soviet 
Union whose citizens were denied these human rights. 
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After the Iranian revolution of 1978 and 1979, Carter’s rhetoric became more assertive. He 
started to emphasize America’s exceptional strength more often. The second OPEC oil 
crisis hit the Carter presidency and his popularity, along with the Iran hostage crisis at the 
United States Embassy in Tehran. 
 
Just like Ford’s, Carter’s foreign policy goal and the goal of his exceptional rhetoric was to 
unite the nation after the events of Vietnam and Watergate. Only the goals were different. 
The rhetoric of both presidents invoked American exceptionalism with slight variations. 
Both used often the metaphorical word “beacon” to refer to the exceptional qualities of the 
United States as leading the path and shining a light on the world. Both referred to God’s 
blessings and the privileged and providential role of the United States in the world. The 
only difference was the policy content in their speeches. Ford was a pragmatic Hamiltonian 
realist, whereas Carter was a Wilsonian idealist.  
 
The question whether either one of them succeeded in their task in uniting the nation does 
not fall under the spectrum of this study, but since neither one of them served more than 
one term as president (although both ran for the second term), suggests that perhaps they 
did not. Perhaps the country needed a former Hollywood actor, “the Great Communicator”, 
Ronald Reagan to do that. Finding that out would be part of another study. 
 
In these concluding remarks, it would be also useful to look at the rhetorical devices that 
both Ford and Carter used to persuade the public behind their policies. Religion played 
here an important role. Referring to God was a common premise linking the presidents and 
the audience together. Applying Perelman’s concept of “new rhetoric” to the interaction, it 
turns out that the concept of “God” was here a mutually negotiated between agreement, 
which created a process of identification between the president and the audience. This 
identification was possible for reasons of historical tradition, invention of tradition, and the 
“imagined community” to which both the presidents and the audience belonged. 
 
Another good premise for presidents to use was referring to the Founding Fathers and 
quoting former presidents, which especially Ford used excessively. This device was also 
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applying traditions and the sense of historical community, thus bridging the rhetorical gap 
between the president and the audience to create unity and support for president’s policies. 
 
The undisputed role of the president as the leader of the nation is also a mutually 
negotiated agreement between him and the nation. This is seen in various foreign policy 
crisis situations when the public rallies around the president who is using rhetoric filled 
with American exceptionalism. Signs of this phenomenon were noticeable when Carter’s 
job approval ratings soared when he was acting tough on Iran during the hostage crisis 
from November 1979 to January 1980. 
 
Presidents are actively molding the constructivist structure in ways they think are 
beneficial to their policy goals. Since nationalistic rhetoric has the history and the tradition 
and the sense of being behind it, it begs a question whether the presidential rhetoric 
becomes a cycle which circulates nationalistic rhetoric with more and more force 
ultimately reflecting more and more nationalistic ideas of the public and becoming 
increasingly populist. Signs of change to the rhetorical “public philosophy” have already 
been seen in the European framework with regards to the steep rise of various populist 
parties successfully invoking nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric. This trend has been 
seen recently in the United States presidential election races as well with the rise of 
increasingly extremist and populist candidates. 
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